

TOP SECRET

3 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 3 February 1969

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Godfrey reported that Tha Teng is again under pressure and that this pattern is cyclical. He observed that Mr. Kissinger has inquired why pressure is exerted in a cyclical manner, and Godfrey remarked that this is simply a pattern which can best be explained through expanded briefings and background data for White House consumption.

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D/ONE reported that an Estimate on Japan is being undertaken with a suspense time of 20 February. He noted that the Estimate is being undertaken in response to NSC initiative, and the Director observed that there will be no security problem in labeling the Estimate for NSC use in ONE schedules.

Carver reported that there was no major military activity over the weekend but that a substantial arms cache was found in the vicinity of the Saigon racetrack. He observed that it was from this general vicinity that last year's Tet offensive was launched.

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[REDACTED]

Carver observed that he received no calls over the weekend with respect to Joe Kraft's article in the Sunday Washington Post regarding Carver/Moor differences in evaluating the Vietnamese scene.

*Maury reported that the briefing of Senator Stennis went well but that the Senator indicated an interest in the degree to which the Agency relies on DOD data for its Vietnam reporting. The Director observed that this is a question which will probably be raised in the future and that we should perhaps prepare a "textbook" on how we utilize and evaluate data provided by the U. S. military in Vietnam.

Maury reported that there have been eighteen acceptances for tomorrow's breakfast. The Director stated that he will provide some brief introductory remarks, to be followed by a briefing by the Executive Director on the organization and functions of the Agency, leaving ample time for questions and answers.

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[REDACTED]

*Maury reported that Senator Ervin has reintroduced his bill with fifty-three sponsors. Executive Director noted his view that, rather than attack the bill per se, the Agency should seek an exception to its provisions. The Director asked that Maury get in touch with Robert Hampton, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and Bryce Harlow in an effort to table Agency considerations.

*Maury reported that, while he was in Senator Stennis' office, it appeared that the Senator received a call from Senator Young. The Director noted his surprise at the appearance of Senator Young's speech in the Sunday New York Times [REDACTED]

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DD/P reported that we are receiving good air support in Tha Teng.

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The Director called attention to a note of 5 February from Mr. Kissinger with respect to the preparation of briefing materials for an NSC review of contingency planning with respect to Berlin, the Middle East, and Korea.

25X1 The Director mentioned a memorandum from John Bross and asked who will replace [] as Chairman of COMIREX. Bross
25X1 noted that Admiral Taylor had obtained General Carroll's support in
25X1 the nomination of [] as Chairman, and there was a brief
discussion of what formal USIB Secretariat action will be required to
formalize the appointment of []

The Director asked when the memorandum on Asian reaction to various Vietnamese settlement formulae will be completed. Godfrey reported that a draft memorandum will be completed today.

The Director asked how we are doing on the placement of BALPA returnees. Executive Director noted that all have been assigned to unfilled positions in directorates, that no problems have been encountered, and that there is no necessity for "make work" positions.

The Director asked whether we are still holding the line on space allocation, and the Executive Director replied affirmatively.

*The Director called attention to opposition to the Sentinel system and to the articles by Russell Baker and John Finney in the Sunday New York Times. He observed that, unless we handle our briefings in a well-coordinated fashion, the Agency may find itself in the position of being "the bird in the badminton game." The Director cautioned against sending to the Hill papers on these matters which might be used for political reasons and asked that we rely on oral briefings.

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The Director called attention to an article by E. W. Kenworthy in the Sunday New York Times entitled "Study on Pueblo Discerns Weaknesses in Control." The Director noted that each department concerned with approval of the Pueblo mission seems to be saying that it was authorized by their designated representative.



The Director led a discussion and canvassed each attendee on the merit of holding a memorial service in the Agency for Mr. Dulles. The balance of opinion expressed felt that such a memorial service would be anticlimactic but that copies of the eulogy and prayer given at the church service should be widely circulated throughout the Agency. DD/P will ask C/CI to determine the appropriateness of interested DD/P officers' signing a memorial book for Mrs. Dulles. The Director indicated his reluctance to sanction the establishment of a memorial fund for Mr. Dulles, given Mrs. Dulles' opposition to stipulating charities to be remembered. The Director once again expressed his deep appreciation to all those who effected the arrangements for the service and asked that his personal appreciation be conveyed to those concerned.



L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

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Facing Facts

Nixon's Team Is Trying to Determine What's Really Happening in Vietnam

By Joseph Kraft

THE NIXON Administration has not yet fully formulated its policy for Vietnam. But in one critical area, the new men have decisively parted company with the practices of the Johnson Administration.

They are not kidding themselves, or the country, with rosy progress reports. Instead of merely spouting statistics and homilies designed to justify past actions, they are making a systematic effort to determine what is really happening in Vietnam.

THIS WILLINGNESS to face facts, even unpleasant facts, finds a notable expression in what President Nixon himself said about a cease-fire at his first White House news conference. In the past, a cease-fire in Vietnam was airily included in the official line as a distinct possibility.

How could it not be? The seat of all the trouble was supposed to be an invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. A settlement required only that the North leave its neighbor in the South alone. Once that happened, a cease-fire was child's play.

Mr. Nixon came off this nonsense with a vengeance. By reference to a guerrilla struggle, he implicitly recognized that the insurgents had deep local roots all over Viet-

nam. Responsible for the violence," he discreetly surfaced some doubts as to whether the regime in Saigon was all that peace-minded.

Then he went on to tell the truth about how much of an illusion it was to expect a cease-fire. He said: "I think it is not helpful in discussing Vietnam to use such terms as cease-fire, because cease-fire is a term of art that really has no relevance, in my opinion, to a guerrilla war."

IN KEEPING with the new President's appetite for the facts, there has been a significant change in the flow of Vietnam information to the White House. President Johnson depended on his special assistant for national security affairs, Walt Rostow, a fervent partisan of the Vietnam involvement. Rostow in turn looked to a unit in the Central Intelligence Agency headed by George Carver.

Nobody doubts Carver's knowledge of Vietnam or his basic competence. But according to a wide variety of officials in both the Defense and State Departments, the Carver unit largely served up to Rostow what he wanted to hear.

Thus before the Tet offensive of last year, its evaluations were apparently very optimistic about the progress being made in subduing the insurgency. These reports justified the continuing military effort on the ground that success was not too far away.

Subsequent to Tet, the Carver unit apparently filled

the air with predictions of a second and third and fourth wave of attacks by the other side. The effect of these reports was to put a discount on the Paris peace talks on the theory that the other side was only using the talks as a stalling device while winding up for a knockout blow on the ground.

Rostow's replacement at the White House, Henry Kissinger, has from the beginning sought to bring on to his staff a capacity for critical evaluation of the intelligence reports. The man he originally sought—one of Carver's chief critics—was not available.

In the end, Kissinger took on his staff a former CIA man, Dean Moore. But Moore was not a member of the Carver unit. He is known to his colleagues at the agency and at the Departments of Defense and State as a top-flight analyst without any bias.

ALL THIS, to be sure, does not add up to anything like a change in policy. But the ground is plainly being laid for change if conditions are found to warrant it. True toughmindedness, a disposition to face facts and to be skeptical and analytical, is at last being substituted for that ultimate expression of romantic sentimentality which caused so many leading figures in the Johnson Administration to equate fighting a war that could not be won with hardheaded realism.

Another Opinion

'No More Pueblos'

The following are excerpts from a speech on the Pueblo incident made on the Senate floor last week by Senator Stephen Young, Democrat of Ohio and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

It is of utmost importance that President Nixon, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, direct a complete separation of the operation of our spy or intelligence collecting ships from the U.S. Navy, even to the extent of honorably discharging enlisted men, and encouraging some officers to resign from the Navy.

The Pueblo operation was a disgrace from the outset to the moment that Commander Bucher without offering even show of resistance suffered the North Korean boarding party from a small North Korean naval vessel to back against our armed naval vessel and board and capture it without any resistance whatever. During two hours of harassment preceding that, Commander Bucher never even had the covers removed from the ship's .50-caliber guns, nor did he proceed out to sea away from about 13 miles off the coast of North Korea at full speed.

The first lesson that officials of the executive branch of our Government must take to heart from this is that we must without delay completely separate the operations of all our intelligence collecting factories, such

as the sister ships to the Pueblo and others, from the U.S. Navy.

Our 10 or more intelligence collecting, or spy, ships must be commanded and staffed with officers and crew being civilians and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency as civilians. True, the commanders and executive officers and most of the seamen would undoubtedly be men whose past records as officers and enlisted men of our Navy have been excellent, during their period of former service in our Navy.

C.I.A. Responsibility

Director Helms of the C.I.A., replete with a sad record of blunders such as the U-2 affair and the poorly planned Bay of Pigs operation, must bear the responsibility for the disgraceful Pueblo disaster. It is evident that this was an unnecessary and an ill-timed operation from the outset. He and the admirals of our Navy are to be condemned for this risky intelligence collecting operation just outside the 12-mile limit back and forth along the coast of North Korea at a time when we were so heavily involved in a major war in Vietnam and Thailand. It is evident not only that it was ill-timed but poorly planned.

There must be an investigation of this sordid affair. There are so many unanswered questions. Why, for example, should an American ship engaged solely

on a C.I.A. operation be commanded by a U.S. Navy Reserve commander then on active duty? Spying is and always has been an operation conducted by either civilians or by men who are ostensibly acting as civilians and have been separated from duties as Army or Navy officers.

Now, many citizens write that Commander Bucher should be awarded a medal. A medal for what? Let us think of John Paul Jones, Decatur, Preble, and Capt. James Lawrence, of the 44-gun American frigate *Chesapeake*, mortally wounded when his frigate was boarded by officers and men of the English 44-gun frigate *Shannon* outside of Boston oceanfront in 1813 at a time when he was valiantly seeking to repel the British boarding party. The last words of Captain Lawrence as he was carried below deck mortally wounded were, "Don't give up the ship."

It is certain that both the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to employ spy ships. In view of the Pueblo blunder, our nation must devise a new policy for handling any future incidents like that of the Pueblo. Spying is a risky business. The risks ought to be well considered in advance.

There must be no more Pueblo incidents. The Congress and President Nixon should give priority to straightening out and reforming our Central Intelligence Agency and its spying operations. Commencing with President Eisenhower there has been a pattern of C.I.A. blunders, humiliating to our Presidents and to the American people. Will President Nixon be the next to be afflicted by some horrendous C.I.A. blunder? Let there be no more Pueblos.

Observer: The Multi-Million Dollar Sentinel Caper

By RUSSELL BAKER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — News Item: Secretary of Defense Laird says that spending more money on the Sentinel antiballistic-missile system will strengthen this country's bargaining position in possible arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

* * *

There was a group of men in khaki at the door saluting. "We want you to love us," Captain Spokesman said. It was obvious that they were about to do something truly unspeakable.

"Give it to me straight, Spokesman. I can take it."

We Want Your Love

"The vacant lot behind your house has been selected to become a Sentinel site," he said. "We want you not only to understand but also to cooperate in this important project and, if you can find it in your heart to do so, even to love us."

"What is a Sentinel, Captain? Why does it need a site?" They like for you to ask them stupid questions. It reinforces their conviction that you need their protection.

"The Sentinel, sir, is the new United States antiballistic missile. Armed with a nuclear warhead, it is capable—"

"Ah, Spokesman, old man." "Sir?"

"Armed with a nuclear warhead?"

"Yes sir."

"In the vacant lot behind my house you propose to situate this machine containing an atomic bomb?"

"Affirmative, sir." He saluted, as did the other men in his group. "We, of course, want your goodwill to make this dramatic neighborhood development the success we know it is capable of becoming. Can we count on your love, sir?"

Irony you can sometimes use on them because it often goes over their heads. "Love you, Captain Spokesman? How could I not love you sitting in my back yard with an atomic bomb, alert to shoot down incoming Russian missiles with our splendid Sentinel, thus guaranteeing the preservation of American second-strike capability?"

Major Techno saluted. "Major Techno of Hardware De-

velopment, sir," he said. "Actually, sir, Sentinel will not shoot down incoming Russian missiles."

"Why not, Major?"

"Because it's no good against sophisticated missiles such as the Russians have, sir," said the major. "It would be a waste of taxpayers' money to shoot the poor old Sentinel at anything as fancy as those Russian incoming missiles."

"In other words, Techno, the Pentagon, unable to stop incoming Russian missiles with its good-for-nothing Sentinel, proposes to bury its mistake in my vacant lot? Isn't that pretty low, Techno? How much did that Sentinel cost the Government?"

Colonel Mohl saluted. "Colonel Mohl of the Purse Division," he said. "Actually, sir, our original estimates for Sentinel are on the order of \$5 billion. Of course, experience with this sort of program indicates that final costs will

exceed estimates by 100 per cent, and that hardware when finally operational will perform at only 25 per cent of specification unless elaborate modifications are made. Thus, I would estimate, very roughly, mind you, that it will cost perhaps \$18 billion to develop a Sentinel program fully incapable of stopping a Russian missile attack."

A sensational idea was developing! "Look, Mohl, I know there's a flaw in my reasoning somewhere, but wouldn't we not only be just as incapable of stopping a Russian missile attack if we didn't have a Sentinel in my back yard, but also be \$18 billion better off in the Purse Division?"

General Dapper saluted. "General Dapper of World Strategy," he said. "If you'll forgive me, sir, the flaw in your reasoning is its failure to take into account the possibility that the Chinese will attack us with missiles."

"Ah, then Sentinel will protect us from an attack by Chinese missiles!"

"Correct, sir! We want your love, sir."

"And the Chinese missiles are so bad that even our poor old Sentinel can shoot them down?"

"Frankly, sir," said the general, "Chinese missiles right now are nonexistent, but we're betting that when the Chinese get some they'll be strictly mail-order-catalogue junk."

"So in my vacant lot you want to put an \$18 billion machine with an atomic bomb that might just possibly work if the Chinese for once happen to live down to our underestimates of their abilities and produce a missile so inferior that even a miserable Sentinel can shoot it down?"

At the Bargaining Counter

Secretary of Defense Laird saluted. "Secretary Laird, or the Big Picture," he said. "You see, sir, we may soon have to negotiate on arms control with the Russians. So long as we have a thoroughly useless Sentinel we have a nice little bargaining counter we can trade away to the Russians without giving up any real kill power."

"But since the Sentinel only works against Chinese, why should the Russians trade you anything for it?"

"Don't you love us?"

"You're soaking me \$18 billion for a nonweapon that will help you come out of an arms reduction negotiation in a better position to soak me some really big billions for some really big weapons, and you want me to love you?"

"We want you to love us." Oh, they're so beguiling!

Foes of Antimissile Net Increase In Senate Attacks on Pentagon

Kennedy Joins Sentinel System Critics
as Others Plan Inquiry Into Influence
of the 'Military-Industrial Complex'

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1.—The Defense Department is being caught in a pincer movement in the Senate. A bipartisan coalition threatening to block the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system and to investigate the influence of what former President Dwight D. Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex."

Not since World War II has the Pentagon been so placed on the defensive on Capitol Hill.

It now appears that close to a majority of the Senate is opposed to the Sentinel antimissile missile system, a five-year nationwide project designed to provide a "thin shield" against Chinese weapons by detecting approaching missiles with radar and intercepting them with nuclear-armed antimissile missiles. With the opposition to the Sentinel anti-

Political 'Folly' Seen

Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, the Senate Democratic whip, openly joined the battle today with a letter to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird protesting that it would be political "folly" and a serious technical mistake for the United States to commit billions of dollars to build a yet-unproved missile defense system.

In his first public statement on the issue, Senator Kennedy proposed that the Administration impose a freeze on the construction of sentinel sites while it conducts a National Security Council review into the desirability of deploying a missile defense system.

"Such a freeze," he said in a four-page letter, "would make a definite contribution to the cause of world peace, would reassure the nation that our national defense programs are sound and rational, and would heighten the possibility that we will be able to deal more effectively with our domestic needs."

Meanwhile, the Pentagon faces a broader attack on another flank by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which provided the hard core of resistance to the Sentinel system.

With considerable secrecy so as not to arouse the jurisdictional jealousies of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee is proposing to set up a special subcommittee to investigate the global and domestic activities of the Defense Department.

Foreign Policy Impact

Obviously the subcommittee would look into the nation's global commitments and their impact upon foreign policy. But this mandate would be but a vehicle for investigating the impact and influence of the military establishment.

Thus the investigation would probably go into such issues as the command and control being exercised over military units, such as the Pueblo intelligence ship, indoctrination programs conducted by the Pentagon to educate the public on foreign policy issues, the political use made of military aid programs in underdeveloped countries, as in Latin America, and Pentagon sponsorship of nonmilitary social science research.

The subcommittee probably would be headed by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, a choice that illustrates the changing attitude in the Senate toward the Defense Department.

By seniority rights, Senator Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force, should take over the chairmanship of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee, which is the principal defender of military programs.

But Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the parent Armed Services Committee, will retain the helm over the influential subcommittee. So Senator Symington is likely to become chairman of a rival subcommittee that should develop into the principal critic of the Pentagon.

That Senate attitudes toward the Pentagon were changing became apparent last year when Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, led what amounted to a one-man battle against the Sentinel system. While the battle is still being led by Senator Cooper, the opposition this year is much better organized and has recruited such young activists as Senator Kennedy and Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois.

Futile Assaults

In his letter, Senator Kennedy argued that technically there was "no conclusive evidence" that the Sentinel system would work, he said that from a political standpoint the Sentinel system would "vitalize an unparalleled opportunity to lessen world tensions" through an economic standpoint such a system would be so costly as to cause "a distortion of Federal funding priorities."

Noting that there has been considerable discussion of the "peace dividend" that would be made available with the end of

country than unite it should we apply this dividend, whatever it may be, to deployment of an ABM system rather than to our domestic housing, employment, health, education, conservation and other needs."

In a series of futile assaults last year on the initial \$647-million installment for the Sentinel, Senator Cooper surprised the military establishment in the Senate by corraling 42 Senators to his side.

This year the Defense Department is requesting \$1.4-billion in deployment funds. As the request has grown, so also in the opinion of such Senators as Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, has the opposition mounted to the Sentinel.

Opponents of the Sentinel can now count on about 45 votes in the Senate, and with a few switches and recruits among freshman Senators they can command a majority.

Whether the opposition can win over the crucial few votes depends in large measure upon how emphatically the Nixon Administration comes out in favor of the Sentinel.

During his confirmation hearings earlier this month, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said he had "some questions" whether we should push forward simply with a system that defends against the Chinese threat only.

But then at a news conference this week, Mr. Laird, echoing the arguments of his predecessor, Clark M. Clifford, said the United States should proceed with the Sentinel system to strengthen its bargaining position in any missile-control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Laird Logic

As far as the Sentinel opponents are concerned, this Laird logic plays into their hands, for it questions how the United States can improve its bargaining position against the Soviet Union by building a system whose effectiveness has not been established and which is designed against the Chinese, not the Russians.

Even for defense against Chinese missiles, the opposition has obtained intelligence, information challenging the value of the Sentinel. Thus, in intelligence briefings, Senator Cooper has obtained estimates that Communist China would be capable of producing in small quantity relatively sophisticated nuclear warheads, which, with the assistance of such penetration aids as decoys, would be capable of overcoming the Sentinel system.

As a result of last year's battle, the opposition has already won one important concession from the Senate military establishment which should help it prepare a case against the Sentinel.

Last year the Senate Armed Services Committee held routine hearings on the Sentinel, with only Pentagon officials testifying. This year, at the request of Senator Cooper, the committee has agreed to hear independent experts, giving the opposition the opportunity to present, for example, the testimony of former Presidential science advisers who have opposed deployment of an ABM system.

Resistance Building

The opposition should also be aided by another political factor, namely the local resistance building up in some communities that have been selected for Sentinel bases.

Until the Army started buying and clearing Sentinel sites, the debate was fought out on largely abstract terms. But now the debate is acquiring apocalyptic backlash as the Senators hear from constituents opposed to the location of a Sentinel base in their communities.

Senator Percy, for example, is receiving 750 to 1,000 letters a week from constituents opposed to a Sentinel site in the Chicago area. If Senator Percy is feeling such political pressure, so presumably is Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, who as Senate Republican leader probably holds the key to the outcome of the Senate debate on the Sentinel system.

A question being asked in Senate circles is whether Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who is up for re-election in 1970, will be so ready to stand up as the principal Senate champion of the Sentinel system now that opposition is developing in Senate circles outside the city.

Study on Pueblo Discerns Weaknesses in Control

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — A staff study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concludes that the Pueblo affair has once again revealed serious weaknesses in the whole command and control system for American intelligence gathering operations.

According to informed sources, the staff found that in the Pueblo incident the weaknesses in command and control encompassed the level at which the ship's mission was first approved and daily monitored; the timing of the mission; the risks assumed; the contingency planning in event of attack or seizures, and the dismissal of a warning about "spy boats" as "routine."

Most Serious Defect

The warning was delivered by the North Koreans to American officers at Panmunjom three days before the Pueblo was seized by North Korea on Jan. 23, 1968.

The most serious defect the committee staff found in the command and control system was the very small amount of coordination between the diplomatic and military arms of the Government.

The study was based on voluminous material supplied through the Department of State by the Defense Department in response to questions by the committee a year ago.

This is the background to the staff study:

Last Feb. 2, the committee asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk a series of questions. On March 25, Mr. Rusk replied to most, but not all, of them. On May 1, Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, sent another set of questions to Mr. Rusk, who returned answers on June 28.

The committee's first two questions were: "When was this plan approved?" and "Who participated in the decision?" It got an answer to the first, but not a complete reply to the second.

"Carefully Planned"

After the seizure of the ship, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told a House Defense Appropriations subcommittee that the mission "was carefully planned and reviewed all the way from

Staff of Senate Panel Finds Little Coordination Among Diplomats and Military

the fleet commander in the Pacific through the chain of command to the higher echelon of Government, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Last Feb. 1, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the mission had not been approved directly by himself but by "my representative." Secretary Rusk likewise informed the committee that his designated representative had approved it.

Both Secretaries took responsibility for the decision, but both departments refused to identify the representatives who had made it.

In its conclusions, the Foreign Relations Committee staff surmised that the decision had been made well down in the bureaucracy and that those responsible for the over-all management of foreign policy were only dimly aware, if at all, of the Pueblo's mission, and not at all aware of the timing.

The timing of the mission came in for sharp criticism in the staff study. Although the Johnson Administration, in its defense of the mission, took the position that the risks had been minimal, the staff noted that the mission began when North Korea was plainly in an extremely belligerent mood.

Violations Increasing

Alleged North Korean violations of the armistice agreement had increased tenfold in a year and 31 North Korean commandos had just unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Chung Hee Park of South Korea in Seoul.

The staff study puts major emphasis on the apparent failure of the diplomatic and military missions in Seoul to take seriously a warning delivered by Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Kook, the North Korean delegate, to Rear Adm. John V. Smith, the senior United Nations delegate, at Panmunjom on Jan. 20, three days before the seizure of the Pueblo.

This is the story behind that warning, which was belatedly received in Washington.

On Jan. 24, the day after the seizure, there was a meeting at Panmunjom, at which Admiral Smith protested the "heinous" attempt on President Park's life and the "criminal" seizure of the Pueblo. The next day the State Department released the transcript of the meeting. Buried in pages of vituperative language by General Pak was this sentence:

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commission held four days ago, I again registered a strong protest with your side against hav-

ing infiltrated into our coastal waters a number of armed spy boats, together with a group of South Korean fishing boats, and repeatedly demanded you immediately stop such criminal acts."

In response to a query by The New York Times on Jan. 26 on whether there had been such a meeting and warning on Jan. 20, the State Department replied that it knew of no such meeting. However, it cabled Seoul and learned that there ing. The transcript arrived later.

When Secretary McNamara emerged from the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Feb. 1—12 days after the warning at Panmunjom—he was asked about it. He replied that, to his knowledge, there had not been a meeting on Jan. 20. He instructed an aide to make inquiry.

When the Jan. 20 transcript arrived, it showed General Pak to have said in part:

"It is quite obvious that if one continued the provocative act of dispatching spy boats and espionage bandits to the coastal waters of the other side under the cover of naval craft, it will only result in disrupting the armistice and inducing another war. We have the due right to make a due response to your thoughtless play with fire. We will fully exercise our rights."

The State and Defense Departments took the position that such warnings about spy ships had become so routine as to justify ignoring them.

The committee staff in its conclusions, however, was understood to have contended that, given the then belligerency of North Korea, prudence would have suggested that the Pueblo be ordered 25 to 30 miles at sea, or else provided with protection.